SECURITIES REGULATION: RULE lOb-5 UNDER
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 HELD NOT TO
REQUIRE PRIVITY FOR PRIVATE RECOVERY

IN

THE

recent case of Cochran v. Channing Corp.,1 the District

Court for the Southern District of New York held that rule 1Ob-5
under section 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 imposes a duty upon corporate insiders, notwithstanding a lack of
privity between the parties, to disclose "material facts" to sellers of
stock prior to engaging in their own personal dealings in the stock.
It is not unusual for a court to construe rule lOb-5 to impose on
insiders such a duty of disclosure when the parties with whom they
are dealing are in privity, but the extent to which the duty will be
recognized to support private recovery in the absence of privity
between the parties has not been clearly defined.
In the Cochran case, individual defendant insiders, who were
directors of both defendant Channing Corporation (Channing) and
Agriculture Insurance Company (AIC), were alleged to have caused
Channing to secretly purchase controlling interest in AIC and to
have used their control position to intentionally reduce AIC's dividend rate and thereby enable the purchase of additional shares at
depressed prices. Plaintiff sought to recover for his loss on the sale
of 500 AIC shares made in reliance on the dividend reduction as
indicative of depleted value, contending that defendants' course
of conduct was a violation of rule lOb-5. Defendants moved for
dismissal on the grounds that section 10 (b) and rule lOb-5 there1211 F. Supp. 239 (S.DN.Y. 1962).
-"It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly, by the use of any

means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange . . . (b) To use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or
any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10 (b), 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1958) [hereinafter referred to as Exchange Act].
Rule lOb-5, prescribed under § 10 (b) of the Exchange Act, makes it "unlawful ...
(1) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (2) To make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or (3) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1949).
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under both require privity of contract, and, in any event, no violation had occurred since no verbal misrepresentations had been made.
In dismissing the motion, the court stated that the lack of privity,
though a factor to be considered, does not preclude recovery in the
context of the alleged facts, and that rule 1Ob-5 can be violated
without making any statements whatsoever.3 The court further
held that rule 10b-5 imposes upon an insider the duty to disclose
facts which would materially affect the judgment of the other party
4
to the transaction.
The duty of an insider to disclose material facts was an early
common law development, which arose because of the insider's
position in a corporation which affords him access to information
not available to the ordinary investor. 5 The degree and character
of disclosure presently required at common law varies depending
upon which of three basic views is followed by a particular jurisdiction. Initially no fiduciary duty was recognized between insiders
and investors; thus an insider was required only to refrain from
active misrepresentation." The harsh treatment of investors frequently resulting under this rule has led a few jurisdictions to adopt
an approach which treats the insider as a fiduciary and requires him
to fully disclose and explain all material facts to the person with
whom he is trading.7 While this view is not widely accepted, a
third approach has been embraced by a large and growing number
of jurisdictions which similarly acknowledge the injustice of the
older rule. These jurisdictions hold that "special circumstances"
sometimes exist which give rise to a duty of disclosure.8 Under
2 211 F. Supp. at 243.

The facts of a particular case need not fall within the

language of all three clauses in order to constitute a violation of rule lOb-5.

While

it is probable that their areas of operation overlap, it is sufficient if any one of the
clauses proscribes the activity in question. See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp.
808, 829 (D. Del. 1951); In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 6668 (Nov. 8, 1961), text at nn.12 & 19; Meisenholder, Scienter and
Reliance as Elements in Buyer's Suit Against Seller Under Rule 1OB-5, 4 CoRtP. PpaCr.

Comm. 27, 29-30 (1963).
'211 F. Supp. at 243.
GSee LATTIN, CORPORATIONs 262-66 (1959); 3 Loss, SECURiTIES REGULATION 1446-48
& nn.4-8 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss]; Bere, Publicity of Accounts and
Directors' Purchases of Stock, 25 MIcH. L. REv. 827 (1927).
0 See, e.g., Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581 (N.Y. 1869); see Walker, The Duty
of Disclosure by a DirectorPurchasing Stock from His Stockholders, 32 YALE L.J. 637
(1923); Annot., 84 A.L.R. 615 (1933).
7 See Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903); Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan.
530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932).
8The leading case for this view is Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). For the
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none of the three theories, however, has recovery been allowed without privity between the parties. 9
These common law actions, although still available, generally
proved to be insufficient to adequately protect the ordinary investor.
Insiders, through manipulation of the market and use of information available only to themselves, found little difficulty in using
their corporate positions to personal advantage.' 0 The unstable
market conditions resulting from such abusive practices prompted
federal legislation aimed at renewing investor confidence in securities. The Securities Exchange Act of 193411 containing a battery of
regulatory provisions resulted. Section 16 (b) 12 of that act has been
one of the most effective weapons against unfair use of information
by insiders. Under this section a corporation itself can recover all
profits which an insider has realized by trading in the corporation's
3
Sections 9 and 10 (a) 14
securities within any six-month period.'
suggestion that courts are moving toward the fiduciary rule by applying and expanding
the "special circumstances" doctrine, see 3 Loss 1447; STEVENS, PRIVATE COIOPATiONS
696 (1949).
"See Rubin & Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions Upon Unfair Use of Corporate Information by Insiders, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 468, 497 (1947).
While there are no cases directly on point, in a Massachusetts case involving the
purchase by directors of their corporation's stock on an exchange, the court stated
that such sales were impersonal in nature and that directors could not be expected to
seek out the ultimate party to the transaction in order to make disclosures. The
court further indicated that business of this type should be governed by practical
rules and not burdened by onerous duties; however, where a director deals directly
with a stockholder, the transaction will be more closely examined. Goodwin v. Agassiz,
283 Mass. 358, 362-63, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (1933). See LATrIN, CORPORATIONS 265-66
(1959); Walker, supra note 6. But see BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 215, 216 (rev. ed.
1946).
Requiring the insider to disclose to all selling stockholders would, if anything,
increase the practical difficulties whether the sale was effected on or off an exchange.
Furthermore the extent of the disclosure required depends upon the circumstances
peculiar to the relationship of the insider and the particular stockholder with whom
he is trading, and it is only to this stockholder that disclosure must be made, though
disclosure through general channels may be sufficient. See Taylor v. Wright, 69 Cal.
App. 2d 371, 159 P.2d 980 (1945); Stewart v. Harris, 69 Kan. 498, 77 Pac. 277 (1904);
FLErTcHER, PisvATE CoRPoRAnoNs §§1168.2, 1171 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1947); Berle,
supra note 5, at 831.
1oSee Hearings before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on S. Res.
84, S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97, 72d Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 653, passim (1932-1934).
1148 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §78 (1958), as amended (Supp. I
1961).
'2Exchange
Act §16, 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §78p (1958). For discussions
of § 16, see 2 Loss 1037-81; Rubin & Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions Upon Unfair Use
of Corporate Information by Insiders, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 468 (1947).
1 From the standpoint of the shareholder who has lost money, however, there
are obvious limitations to an action under § 16(b) of the Exchange Act: (1) Any
recovery inures only to the benefit of the corporation, (2) no action is available against
the insider who can afford to be patient and take his profit after the six-month

Vol. 1963: 796]

SECURITIES REGULATION

also serve as effective deterrents to insider manipulations by specifically prohibiting certain undesirable practices in securities transactions. Section 10 (b), involved in the instant case, generally
prohibits the use of any manipulative or deceptive device in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Although section 10 (b) does not specifically provide private right
of action for individual buyers or sellers, nevertheless, courts have
generally recognized such a right and allowed private recovery. 15
While the pre-requisites of recovery under rule lOb-5 have not been
clearly defined, they apparently are not limited by the elements of
common law deceit. 16 Courts generally construe rule lOb-5 as incorporating the common law duty of disclosure' 7 and requiring
period has elapsed, and (3) the period in which an action can be brought is limited
to 2 years. 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1958).
In the case of the attorney-plaintiff, however, there may be adequate financial
incentive in bringing these suits in that reasonable attorney's fees can be deducted
from the recovery.
(1934), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, j (a) (1958).
14 Exchange Act §§ 9, 10 (a), 48 Stat. 889
The first case so holding was Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512
(E.D. Pa. 1946), hearing on the merits after motion to dismiss denied, 73 F. Supp.
798 (E.D. Pa.), on request for further findings, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947). This
case has been consistently followed. See, e.g., Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th
Cir. 1953); H. L. Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
Most courts justify the existence of a private right of action on the tort theory that
violation of a statute is a wrongful act for which civil liability should be available if
the interest invaded is one which the statute intended to protect. Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., supra at 513. But see Comment, 1962 DuKE L.J. 423, 432-35 suggesting
that this theory, having developed in terms of negligence, is of doubtful relevance
when applied to federal securities legislation.
Other courts take the position that the 1938 amendment to § 29 (b) of the Exchange
Act, creating a short statute of limitations on actions brought for violation of § 15 (c)
(1) (but not expressly providing for a private action), implies that Congress had
always assumed that private actions were available. See Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133
F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955); Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.
N.Y. 1941); Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1134 (1950). But see 3 Loss 1757-60, where
it is suggested that the provisions of § 29 (b) can apply only when there is privity of
contract between plaintiff and defendant.
Perhaps the best explanation for finding a private right of action for yiolation of
the Exchange Act is the necessity of such action to effectively carry out the purposes
of the legislation. See Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 244-45 (2d Cir. 1944) (Clark,
J., dissenting in part) (involving a similar implied liability under § 6 (b)); cf. SEC v.
C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350 (1943) (commenting on principles of
statutory construction).
10 "In general, the type of conduct which subjects one to liability for deceit consists of (1) false representations (2) fraudulently made (3) with the intention of inducing another to rely thereon. If such misrepresentations (4) induce reliance (5)
and the reliance is justified and (6) causes damage, the defendant is liable." 1
HAlRPR
& JAMES, TORTS 528 (1956).
1
7 The proposition that rule lOb-5, quoted in note 2 supra, encompasses the duty
of an insider to disclose material facts, does not rest primarily on any one of the
three clauses. Rather, the duty is implicit in each of the three clauses, thus, failure
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insiders "to disclose a fact coming to their knowledge by reason of
their position, which would materially affect the judgment of the
other party to the transaction."' 8 While in the Cochran case the
court based its decision on the failure of defendants to meet this
duty, it would appear that recovery under rule 1Ob-5 need not have
depended upon the disclosure rule. The court could have rested
its decision on defendants' efforts to bring about the loss complained
of, since these efforts indicate the existence of a scheme to defraud
which would have constituted a violation of at least clauses (1) and
(3) of rule lOb-5.' 9
In view of the available alternative grounds for the decision and
the fact that the disclosure rule, at least at common law, requires
privity, the court's recognition in the Cochran case of the statutory
duty of an insider to disclose, may have implications as to the nature
of a rule lOb-5 action. While recovery under rule lOb-520 is said
not to be limited by the elements of common law deceit, 21 nevertheless, it is thought likely that it does retain the requirements of
reliance 22 and at least "watered-down" scienter. 23 However, at
to disclose may be a violation of one or all three. See Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,
99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951); In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6668 (Nov. 8, 1961), text at n.19.
18211 F. Supp. at 243. The court's statement of the rule is taken from Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 791, 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). For a discussion of what
has been considered a material fact requiring disclosure, see Comment, 59 YALE L.J.
1120, 1145-46 (1950); Note, 40 MINN. L. REv. 62, 69-73 (1955).
29 Plaintiff, in effect, alleged that defendant lowered the dividend rate which falsely
implied a depleted value of the stock; that this was done with the intention of deceiving other stockholders as to the true value and inducing them to sell at a price
reflecting a depletion of value; and that plaintiff, a stockholder, had relied on defendants' action to his detriment. Thus, the allegations satisfy all the elements of
common law deceit as listed in note 16 supra, and certainly should satisfy any requirements of an action under clauses (1) and (3) of lOb-5, quoted in note 2 supra.
Accord, Von Au v. Magenheimer, 126 App. Div. 257, 110 N.Y. Supp. 629 (1908), afJ'd
per curiam, 196 N.Y. 510, 89 N.E. 1114 (1909) (similar fact situation except that
privity existed between the parties); see BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 216 (rev. ed. 1946);
STVaNS, PRVuTE CORPORATIONS 695 (2d ed. 1949).
In the Cochran case the court stated, without mentioning the duty of disclosure,
that "One who causes a reduction of dividend in order more cheaply to purchase the
shares of a corporation is most certainly employing a device to defraud and is engaging in a course of business which operates as a fraud upon the seller of those
securities." 211 F. Supp. at 243.
2sFor the text of rule 1Ob-5, see note 2 supra.
21
See, e.g., Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Texas Continental
Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1960), rev'd on other
grounds sub nor., Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir.
1962).
2 See, e.g., Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808, 823 (E.D. Wis. 1962); Nash v.
J. Arthur Warner & Co., 137 F. Supp. 615, 618 (D. Mass. 1955); Latty, The Aggrieved
Buyer or Seller or Holder of Shares in a Close Corporation Under S.E.C. Statutes, 18
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common law, where a duty to disclose is found, the presence or
absence of scienter and reliance is not determinative. 24 Similarly,
if recovery under rule lOb-5 is based upon such a duty to disclose,
the presence or absence of scienter and reliance should likewise not
be determinative.
The material fact not disclosed by the defendants in the Cochran
case was described by the court to be their "true reason for the dividend cut.

'25

Taken literally, this language is broad enough to

require disclosure of all significant reasons or motivations for corporate action. This, however, is not the typical disclosure requirement; nor is such a broad interpretation justified in the instant case
when the court's statement is viewed in light of the facts involved.
Disclosure was made imperative in the Cochran case by the elements
of improper self-interest and intention to mislead. It would seem
that in the absence of these elements, a distinction should be drawn
between motivations for taking action where the results are still
speculative and motivations when the results are no longer uncertain.2 6 The present case, of course, involved the latter situation,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 505, 526-27 (1953). Contra, Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v.
Bankers Bond Co., supra note 21; Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 83 F. Supp. 613
(E.D. Pa. 1947). But see 3 Loss 1765, where it is noted that several courts have simply
assumed that reliance is a requirement and that the question is still open.
To a certain extent the requirement of reliance is inherent in the concept of
materiality, but in that context it would seem to be a separate consideration and be
resolved in terms of whether anyone would rely, rather than by determining the
actual reliance of the particular defendant. See note 24 infra; cf. 3 Loss 1438.
23See, e.g., Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Thiele v.
Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Seward v. Hammond, 8 F.R.D. 457 (D.
Mass. 1948). Contra, Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Kohler v. Kohler
Co., 208 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wis. 1962). See Meisenholder, supra note 3, at 43-44, 47.
-1If scienter and reliance were required, there would be no distinction from an
action in deceit. Although most commentators and courts discuss the duty of disclosure from the pragmatic standpoint of concrete situations without considering the
basis of the liability, it has been suggested that liability is not based on silence as
equivalent to an implied representation, but rather on the failure of defendant to live
up to an ethical standard of conduct formulated by society for the general circumstances involved. Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEXAs L. REv.
1, 31-40 (1936). While scienter and reliance may sometimes play a part in creating
the situation imposing the duty, they need not be present in all circumstances. See
BOWER, ACTIONABLE NoN-DiscLosurE 275-77 (1915); 1 HARPER & JA~m, ToRTs 590
(1956); PROssER, ToRrs 535 (2d ed. 1955).
,211 F. Supp. at 243.
20 Compare Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947), and
Agatucci v. Corradi, 327 Ill. App. 153, 63 N.E.2d 630 (1945) (later sale assured), with
James Blackstone Memorial Library Ass'n v. Gulf, Mobile & 0. R.R., 264 F.2d 445
(7th Cir. 1959) (ultimate sale at a profit was but a hope).
Vhen dealing in their corporation's stock, insiders' opinions concerning the future
results of corporate action axe generally considered dangerous to the other party.
See Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1148 (1950). In common law actions based on
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since at the time the duty arose, the desired depression of prices
had been obtained.
In determining whether plaintiff was entitled to recover for
defendants' failure to disclose, the lack of privity between the parties was viewed by the court as only an evidentiary fact to be considered. In so doing, the court followed its earlier statement in
Brown v. Bullock, 27 where it had noted three factors to be considered: first, the relationship between the parties; secondly, the
nature of defendants' participation in the transaction; and thirdly,
plaintiff's reliance upon the defendants' act. These factors indicate
that in the Cochran case, when determining the necessity of privity,
the court was greatly influenced by the presence of both scienter and
reliance. Moreover, this suggests that the court intended to define
the "material fact" which defendants had a duty to disclose to include
the entire scheme to defraud.
Certainly, where an insider through affirmative action has created
the situation which enables him to take advantage of the seller's
(or buyer's) reliance and lack of knowledge, a duty to disclose should
be found even though privity does not exist. The modem trend of
common law decisions does not require privity in an action for deceit; 28 neither where scienter and reliance are present should it be
required under rule 1Ob-5, even if the action is based on non.disclosure. The latter situation is descriptive of the Cochran case.
Though there was no privity between the buyer and seller, plaintiff
did allege reliance and the court found that the defendants "not
only failed to disclose a material fact . . . but were themselves responsible for its very existence." 29
The same result should clearly follow even though an insider
deceit, defendants have frequently sought to escape liability by contending that their
statements were merely expressions of opinion on which plaintiffs had no right to rely.
See Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227, 235-38 (1933).
While the accuracy of that contention is not relevant to the instant case, it does suggest the paradox of requiring disclosure of opinions when applying rule 10b-5 to the
same general problem.
27 194 F. Supp. 207, 229-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
's RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 531 (1938), subject to the exceptions of §532 and §536,
limits liability to those persons whom the defendant intended to act in reliance.
But where the defendant's action was intended to affect the market price in order
that he might profit by transactions on the market, it would take a very narrow interpretation of his intention to include within it only those persons that ultimately sold
or purchased stock from him. See 1 HARPER & JAMEs, ToRTS 530 (1956). In addition,
some modern cases have held that it is sufficient that the defendant should have
foreseen or contemplated plaintiff's reliance. See PROSSER, ToRTs, 523, 540-41 (2d ed.

1955).
20211 F. Supp. at 243.
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has not by affirmative action created a situation beneficial to him,
if he has taken advantage of it and privity exists between the parties.
Though this is not the common law rule with respect to transactions
occurring on an exchange, it has been suggested that even then an
insider should not be free of his duty to disclose; 30 rather he should
be required to make necessary publication of all material facts. 3 1
There has been no attempt to impose civil liability in this situation
under rule lOb-5, but it seems clear that the SEC interprets the rule
as requiring the insider to make adequate disclosure or, if this is
prevented by practical difficulties, to refrain from trading. 32 However it is doubtful that this interpretation can be extended to support recovery by those persons not in privity with the insider. Under
those provisions of the securities legislation which expressly provide
for civil liability, recovery is specifically limited by the requirement
of privity or other restrictions. 33 It can be inferred from this legislative pattern of restricting recovery where liability is expressly
provided, that Congress did not intend to allow recovery under
rule lOb-5 where there was no privity and an insider has not taken
affirmative action.3 4
Of course, when viewed in the context of the legislation in which
it is incorporated, the disclosure rule may serve to better promote
the general purposes of the act without attaching the stumbling
block of privity.35 However, if the disclosure rule is used in this

30 BALLANTINE,

CORPORATIONs 215, 216 S=n.95 (rev. ed. 1946).
31 See Comment, 32 MicH. L. Rav. 678, 684-85 (1934); Comment, 59 YALm L.J. 1120,
1149 (1950).
'2 See In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 6668 (Nov. 8, 1961) (partner in a broker-dealer firm suspended from the New
York Stock Exchange for selling stock prior to public announcement of a dividend
cut of which he had been informed by a director).
"3Neither § 9 (e) nor § 18 of the Exchange Act require privity but they specifically
require reliance and place a difficult burden of proof relative to causation on the
plaintiff. Also both sections have a short statute of limitations, and § 18 allows the
defendant to raise an affirmative defense by showing that he, in good faith, had no
knowledge that the statement was false or misleading. Concerning § 16 (b) see note 13
supra.
"In the judicial allowance of a private right of action under § 10 (b) of the Exchange Act, the argument was made and rejected that Congress, having expressly
provided for civil liability under some sections, did not intend such liability under
any other sections. Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 631-32 (9th Cir. 1953); Kardon
v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). However, it is one thing
to assume congressional intention for a private right of action under § 10 (b) in order
to carry out the purposes of the act, but quite another, in view of the express liability
restrictions, to assume that recovery without limitation would also carry out congressional intention.
3GContrary to the common law disclosure rule which was designed to prevent
insiders from taking unfair advantage of minority stockholders, the securities legisla-
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manner, the possibility exists that an insider may be held liable for
damages bearing no reasonable relationship to the amount of profit
obtained by him.3 6 This result runs counter to the previously discussed congressional policy of limiting civil liability under the act.
Furthermore, when an insider has in his possession material information which he does not use to his personal advantage, no liability
attaches, 37 though certainly the general purposes of the act would
also be served by requiring disclosure in such an instance. It would
appear that since the failure to disclose will result in the same loss
to investors, the only significant distinction between the use and
non-use of the information exists in the profit obtained. Therefore,
it would seem that any liability for use of the information should
also be related to the profit obtained. It is not essential that this
limitation be accomplished through the requirement of privity, but
apparently there are no other restrictions presently available. In
view of these considerations, the use of the disclosure rule to impose
civil liability without privity and without action by the defendant
would be a questionable means of furthering the general purposes
of the act.38
No court, however, has been faced with this particular situation,
and all cases dispensing with the requirement of privity under rule
lOb-5 have involved situations wherein there was some affirmative
action by the defendant and some form of reliance by the plaintiff.39 The caution expressed in these cases suggests that where there
tion has the broader purpose of insuring the investor adequate information from which
to make an intelligent judgment. Both the disclosure provisions and the prohibitions
of manipulative practices operate to achieve this result. Compare Berle, Publicity of
Accounts and Directors' Purchases of Stock, 25 MicH. L. Rav. 827, 828 (1927), with
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11, 13, passim (1934).
36 While this may be consistent with the tort concept on which civil liability is
based, it is probably too great a change from the common law position for the courts
to take without statutory impetus. See LATrIN, supra note 5; Meisenholder, supra note
3, at 55. But cf. 3 Loss 1455-56.
37 Defendant as well as plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller where liability is
predicated strictly on non-disclosure without other evidence of a scheme to defraud.
See Donovan, Inc. v. Taylor, 136 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
I8One taking the opposite view could well argue that the possibility of harsh
results will have the desired effect of encouraging disclosure of all pertinent information. It is also likely that many stockholders would never pursue potential claims,
so that in practice damages might not prove unreasonable. This argument might be
concluded by asking why "dishonest directors should . . . find absolution . . . by concealing their identity . . . under the mask of the stock exchange." BALLANnNE,

216 (rev. ed. 1946).
3o See Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956) (defendants knowingly cooperated in the fraud); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951)
(plaintiffs alleged reliance on a prospectus prepared by defendants); Brown v. Bullock,
CORPORATIONS
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is non-disclosure without other deception, privity will be required.
While under the present statutory scheme this appears to be the
proper result, it does indicate the existence of a loophole in the

fraud proscriptions since no one will have standing to bring suit
against the insider who does not reap his profits within a six-month
period. The extent to which the fraud provisions may be ignored,
however, is mitigated by the possibility of administrative sanctions
by the SEC.40 Also a certain amount of disclosure is required by
the Exchange Act requirement for periodic reports to the SEC of

information necessary to keep registration statements current.41 But
these reports are relatively ineffective in providing the type of information needed to prevent this particular insider abuse, and,
moreover, liability for violation of these provisions is limited to
those persons makng or responsible for making false or misleading
42
statements in the report.
Disclosure of material information is a central theme of the
securities legislation and undoubtedly will be emphasized in actions
against insiders. But, while finding a duty to disclose makes unnecessary any discussion of scienter and reliance requirements under
rule lOb-5, this duty is not so readily evident when privity does not
194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co.,
187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1960), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Texas Continental
Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962) (defendants distributed the bonds
and knew of the defect causing their invalidity); Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
Perhaps the case involving a fact situation closest to that of the Cochran case was
Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd
per curiam, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952), in which the court stated that at least a
semblance of privity was required. The court was roundly criticized in a dissent by
Frank, J., and by 4 STAN. L. Rlv. 308 (1952), for incorporating into rule lOb-5 the
restrictive common law notion that plaintiff must be one whom the defendant actually
intended to defraud. But the court in the Joseph case suggested that the result might
have been otherwise had plaintiff alleged reliance. Moreover, decisions by the same
court in the Cochran case and Brown v. Bullock, supra, corroborate this suggestion.
" See, e.g., In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 6668 (Nov. 8, 1961) (broker-dealer suspended for using non-public information of a dividend cut to aid clients prior to its being made public), 71 YAM
L.J. 736 (1962); In the Matter of Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943)
(corporation officers agreed to reimburse other shareholders from whom they had
purchased stock with the intention of reselling at a previously confirmed higher price).
, Exchange Act § 13, 48 Stat. 894 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1958).
,2 Section 13 of the Exchange Act specifies the information and the dates on which
information must be reported. It does not broadly include all information which
might be material, and it does not prevent the use of the information prior to reporting.
Neither is there any provision for the dissemination of the information for use by
the investing public. Any recovery for violation of § 13 would be under § 18, which
contains limitations making recovery difficult. See note 33 supra.
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exist. Thus, as in the Cochran case, mixed reliance upon a duty
to disclose and upon evidence tending to show a scheme to defraud
is justification for not requiring privity, even if part of the burden
necessary to show such a scheme could not be sustained. However,
where there is no evidence of active fraud in addition to non-disclosure, there appears no statutory or judicial justification for re.covery without privity.

